System and method for component authentication of a secure client hosted virtualization in an information handling system

ABSTRACT

A client hosted virtualization system (CHVS) includes a processor to execute code, a security processor, a component that includes a certificate, and a non-volatile memory. The non-volatile memory includes BIOS code for the CHVS and virtualization manager code to initialize the CHVS, launch a virtual machine on the CHVS, and authenticate the component with the security processor by determining that the certificate is valid. The CHVS is configurable to execute the first code and not the second code, or to execute the second code and not the first code.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 12/790,545, filed on May 28, 2010, entitled “System and Methodfor Supporting Task Oriented Devices in a Client Hosted VirtualizationSystem,” by David Konetski et al., which is hereby incorporated byreference.

FIELD OF THE DISCLOSURE

The present disclosure generally relates to information handlingsystems, and more particularly relates to implementing a secure clienthosted virtualization service layer in an information handling system.

BACKGROUND

As the value and use of information continues to increase, individualsand businesses seek additional ways to process and store information.One option is an information handling system. An information handlingsystem generally processes, compiles, stores, or communicatesinformation or data for business, personal, or other purposes.Technology and information handling needs and requirements can varybetween different applications. Thus information handling systems canalso vary regarding what information is handled, how the information ishandled, how much information is processed, stored, or communicated, andhow quickly and efficiently the information can be processed, stored, orcommunicated. The variations in information handling systems allowinformation handling systems to be general or configured for a specificuser or specific use such as financial transaction processing, airlinereservations, enterprise data storage, or global communications. Inaddition, information handling systems can include a variety of hardwareand software resources that can be configured to process, store, andcommunicate information and can include one or more computer systems,graphics interface systems, data storage systems, and networkingsystems. Information handlings systems can also implement variousvirtualized architectures.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

It will be appreciated that for simplicity and clarity of illustration,elements illustrated in the Figures are not necessarily drawn to scale.For example, the dimensions of some elements may be exaggerated relativeto other elements. Embodiments incorporating teachings of the presentdisclosure are shown and described with respect to the drawings herein,in which:

FIG. 1 is a functional block diagram illustrating an informationhandling system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;

FIG. 2 illustrates an embodiment of a client hosted virtualizationsystem on an information handling system;

FIG. 3 is a flow chart illustrating an embodiment of a method ofproviding a client hosted virtualization system;

FIG. 4 is a functional block diagram illustrating an embodiment of aclient hosted virtualization update network;

FIGS. 5 and 6 are flow charts illustrating embodiments of methods forreceiving updates to a client hosted virtualization system;

FIG. 7 is a functional block diagram illustrating another embodiment ofa client hosted virtualization system for implementing I/O portassignment and security policy application;

FIG. 8 is a flow chart illustrating an embodiment of a method ofimplementing I/O policies in a client hosted virtualization system;

FIG. 9 is a functional block diagram illustrating another embodiment ofa client hosted virtualization system and a method of providing pre-bootauthentication in the client hosted virtualization system;

FIG. 10 is a functional block diagram illustrating another embodiment ofa client hosted virtualization system and a method of providing secureaccess to a trusted platform module;

FIG. 11 is a functional block diagram illustrating another embodiment ofa client hosted virtualization system and a method of supporting taskoriented devices in a client hosted virtualization system;

FIG. 12 is a functional block diagram illustrating another embodiment ofa client hosted virtualization system and a method of supporting fullvolume encryption devices for virtual machines that access a commonstorage device in the client hosted virtualization system;

FIG. 13 is a functional block diagram illustrating another embodiment ofa client hosted virtualization system and a method of supportingpre-boot authentication in the client hosted virtualization system; and

FIG. 14 is a functional block diagram illustrating another embodiment ofa client hosted virtualization system and a method of supportingcomponent authentication in the client hosted virtualization system.

The use of the same reference symbols in different drawings indicatessimilar or identical items.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The following description in combination with the Figures is provided toassist in understanding the teachings disclosed herein. The descriptionis focused on specific implementations and embodiments of the teachings.This focus is provided to assist in describing the teachings, and shouldnot be interpreted as a limitation on the scope or applicability of theteachings. Other teachings can be used in this application. Theteachings can also be used in other applications, and with differenttypes of architectures, such as distributed computing architectures,client/server architectures, or middleware server architectures andassociated resources.

In the embodiments described below, an information handling system caninclude any instrumentality or aggregate of instrumentalities operableto compute, classify, process, transmit, receive, retrieve, originate,switch, store, display, manifest, detect, record, reproduce, handle, oruse any form of information, intelligence, or data for business,scientific, control, entertainment, or other purposes. For example, aninformation handling system can be a personal computer, a PDA, aconsumer electronic device, a network server or storage device, a switchrouter, wireless router, or other network communication device, or anyother suitable device and can vary in size, shape, performance,functionality, and price. The information handling system can includememory (volatile (e.g. random-access memory, etc.), nonvolatile(read-only memory, flash memory etc.) or any combination thereof), oneor more processing resources, such as a central processing unit (CPU), agraphics processing unit (GPU), hardware or software control logic, orany combination thereof. Additional components of the informationhandling system can include one or more storage devices, one or morecommunications ports for communicating with external devices, as wellas, various input and output (I/O) devices, such as a keyboard, a mouse,a video/graphic display, or any combination thereof. The informationhandling system can also include one or more buses operable to transmitcommunications between the various hardware components. Portions of aninformation handling system may themselves be considered informationhandling systems.

An information handling system can implement a secure client hostedvirtualization (CHV) architecture with a CHV manager that resides insecure memory of the information handling system, and that receivessecure updates from a managed backend. The CHV manager can launch one ormore virtual machines on the information handling system. The CHVarchitecture can support I/O port assignment and I/O security policyimplementation for the virtual machines. The CHV architecture can alsoprovide a secure interface to security resources of the informationhandling system to provide pre-boot authentication, platform hardwareand software authentication, secure biometric user authentication, andother trusted computing features for the virtual machines. The CHVmanger can support task oriented devices such that each virtual machineobtains the functionality of the task oriented devices. The CHV manageralso can support storage using full volume encryption (FVE) mechanisms,and provide access to common storage devices for multiple virtualmachines.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an embodiment of an informationhandling system 100, including a processor 110, a chipset 120, a memory130, a graphics interface 140, an input/output (I/O) interface 150, adisk controller 160, a network interface 170, a disk emulator 180, and aservice processor 190. In a particular embodiment, information handlingsystem 100 is used to carry out one or more of the methods describedbelow. In a particular embodiment, one or more of the systems describedbelow are implemented in the form of information handling system 100.

Chipset 120 is connected to and supports processor 110, allowingprocessor 110 to execute machine-executable code. In a particularembodiment (not illustrated), information handling system 100 includesone or more additional processors, and chipset 120 supports the multipleprocessors, allowing for simultaneous processing by each of theprocessors and permitting the exchange of information among theprocessors and the other elements of information handling system 100.Chipset 120 can be connected to processor 110 via a unique channel, orvia a bus that shares information among processor 110, chipset 120, andother elements of information handling system 100.

Memory 130 is connected to chipset 120. Memory 130 and chipset 120 canbe connected via a unique channel, or via a bus that shares informationamong chipset 120, memory 130, and other elements of informationhandling system 100. In particular, a bus can share information amongprocessor 110, chipset 120 and memory 130. In another embodiment (notillustrated), processor 110 is connected to memory 130 via a uniquechannel. In another embodiment (not illustrated), information handlingsystem 100 can include separate memory dedicated to each of the one ormore additional processors. A non-limiting example of memory 130includes static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random accessmemory (DRAM), non-volatile random access memory (NVRAM), read onlymemory (ROM), flash memory, another type of memory, or any combinationthereof.

Graphics interface 140 is connected to chipset 120. Graphics interface140 and chipset 120 can be connected via a unique channel, or via a busthat shares information among chipset 120, graphics interface 140, andother elements of information handling system 100. Graphics interface140 is connected to a video display 144. Other graphics interfaces (notillustrated) can also be used in addition to graphics interface 140 ifneeded or desired. Video display 144 can include one or more types ofvideo displays, such as a flat panel display or other type of displaydevice.

I/O interface 150 is connected to chipset 120. I/O interface 150 andchipset 120 can be connected via a unique channel, or via a bus thatshares information among chipset 120, I/O interface 150, and otherelements of information handling system 100. Other I/O interfaces (notillustrated) can also be used in addition to I/O interface 150 if neededor desired. I/O interface 150 is connected via an I/O interface 152 toone or more add-on resources 154. Add-on resource 154 is connected to astorage system 190, and can also include another data storage system, agraphics interface, a network interface card (NIC), a sound/videoprocessing card, another suitable add-on resource or any combinationthereof. I/O interface 150 is also connected via I/O interface 152 toone or more platform fuses 156 and to a security resource 158. Platformfuses 156 functions to set or modify the functionality of informationhandling system 100 in hardware. Security resource 158 provides a securecryptographic functionality and can include secure storage ofcryptographic keys. A non-limiting example of security resource 158includes a Unified Security Hub (USH), a Trusted Platform Module (TPM),a General Purpose Encryption (GPE) engine, another security resource, ora combination thereof.

Disk controller 160 is connected to chipset 120. Disk controller 160 andchipset 120 can be connected via a unique channel, or via a bus thatshares information among chipset 120, disk controller 160, and otherelements of information handling system 100. Other disk controllers (notillustrated) can also be used in addition to disk controller 160 ifneeded or desired. Disk controller 160 can include a disk interface 162.Disk controller 160 can be connected to one or more disk drives via diskinterface 162. Such disk drives include a hard disk drive (HDD) 164 oran optical disk drive (ODD) 166 such as a Read/Write Compact Disk(R/W-CD), a Read/Write Digital Video Disk (R/W-DVD), a Read/Write miniDigital Video Disk (R/W mini-DVD, another type of optical disk drive, orany combination thereof. Additionally, disk controller 160 can beconnected to disk emulator 180. Disk emulator 180 can permit asolid-state drive 184 to be coupled to information handling system 100via an external interface 182. External interface 182 can includeindustry standard busses such as USB or IEEE 1394 (Firewire) orproprietary busses, or any combination thereof. Alternatively,solid-state drive 184 can be disposed within information handling system100.

Network interface device 170 is connected to I/O interface 150. Networkinterface 170 and I/O interface 150 can be coupled via a unique channel,or via a bus that shares information among I/O interface 150, networkinterface 170, and other elements of information handling system 100.Other network interfaces (not illustrated) can also be used in additionto network interface 170 if needed or desired. Network interface 170 canbe a network interface card (NIC) disposed within information handlingsystem 100, on a main circuit board such as a baseboard, a motherboard,or any combination thereof, integrated onto another component such aschipset 120, in another suitable location, or any combination thereof.Network interface 170 includes a network channel 172 that provideinterfaces between information handling system 100 and other devices(not illustrated) that are external to information handling system 100.Network interface 170 can also include additional network channels (notillustrated).

Service processor 195 is preferably a micro-controller embedded ininformation handling system 100 that enables remote monitoring andmanagement of the information handling system. Service processor 195 isseparate from processor 110, and runs separate code on a separateoperating system from the code and operating system of the informationhandling system. In a particular embodiment, service processor 195includes a separate network channel similar to network channel 172 forcommunicating with management services (not illustrated) that areexternal to information handling system 100. In another embodiment,service processor 195 is connected to network interface 170 to gainaccess to network channel 172.

In a particular embodiment, service processor 195 is powered separatelyfrom the rest of information handling system 100, and is implementedsuch that the service processor remains powered on when the rest of theinformation handling system is powered off. Moreover, service processor195 includes connections to the components of information handlingsystem 100 such that status information for the information handlingsystem is available to the service processor when the informationhandling system is powered off. For example, service processor 195 canbe connected to chipset 120, memory 130, graphics interface 140, I/Ointerface 150, disk controller 160, another component of informationhandling system 100, or to a combination of components of theinformation handling system. Service processor 195 operates at ahardware level, and can be configured in accordance with the IntelligentPlatform Management Interface standard. As such, service processor 195carries out data logging, sets system event traps, maintains systemevent logs, and permits access to information handling system 100 via aVirtual KVM (Keyboard/Video/Monitor).

Information handling system 100 includes one or more applicationprograms 132, and Basic Input/Output System and Firmware (BIOS/FW) code134. BIOS/FW code 134 functions to initialize information handlingsystem 100 on power up, to launch an operating system, and to manageinput and output interactions between the operating system and the otherelements of information handling system 100. In a particular embodiment,application programs 132 and BIOS/FW code 134 reside in memory 130, andinclude machine-executable code that is executed by processor 110 toperform various functions of information handling system 100. In anotherembodiment (not illustrated), application programs and BIOS/FW codereside in another storage medium of information handling system 100. Forexample, application programs and BIOS/FW code can reside in HDD 164, ina ROM (not illustrated) associated with information handling system 100,in an option-ROM (not illustrated) associated with various devices ofinformation handling system 100, in storage system 190, in a storagesystem (not illustrated) associated with network channel 172, in anotherstorage medium of information handling system 100, or a combinationthereof. Application programs 132 and BIOS/FW code 134 can each beimplemented as single programs, or as separate programs carrying out thevarious features as described herein.

FIG. 2 illustrates an embodiment of a CHV system 200 including a clientsystem 210 operating at a platform level 292, an optional virtualmachine hypervisor 250 operating at a protection level 294 that is themost protected level, virtual machines 260 and 270, and one or moreadditional virtual machines 280 operating at a protection level 296 thatis above protection level 294, or less protected than virtual machinehypervisor 250. At the platform level 292, client system 210 includesclient platform hardware 220, trusted platform firmware 230, and a CHVmanager 240. In a particular embodiment, client system 210 is aninformation handling system similar to information handling system 100.As such, client platform hardware 220 includes a processor (notillustrated) that operates to execute machine-executable code includedin trusted platform firmware 230 and CHV manager 240 to perform thefunctions of CHV system 200. Client platform hardware 220 also includesa TPM 222, a USH 224, a GPE 226, and a fuse/switch bank 228. Trustedplatform firmware 230 includes a BIOS 232. CHV manager 240 may includeany or all of a service operating system (OS) 242, a stack of drivers244, a policy manager 246, and an update manager 248. In a particularembodiment, virtual machine hypervisor 250 is a commercially availablehypervisor such as Xen, VMware, or other such virtualization systemsthat may reside in a mass storage device (not illustrated).

CHV manager 240 operates from the platform level 292 to initialize CHVsystem 200 on power up, to launch virtual machines 260, 270, and 280,and to manage input and output interactions between virtual machines260, 270, and 280 and client platform hardware 220. In this respect, CHVmanager 240 functions similarly to a combination of a platform BIOS anda virtual machine manager or hypervisor. As such, CHV manager 240 isstored in a non-volatile memory (not illustrated) of client platformhardware 220, such as a firmware ROM embedded on the system board thatis separate from the mass storage device used to store the images forvirtual machines 260, 270, and 280, and that retains the code storedthereon when client system 210 is powered. In a particular embodiment,CHV manager 240 provides that the launching of virtual machines 260,270, and 280 is secure, using digital signatures to verify theauthenticity of the virtual machine images for virtual machines 260,270, and 280. For example, client system 210 can include hardwareextensions with security capabilities to ensure secure launch andexecution of virtual machines 260, 270, and 280, such as TrustedExecution Technology (TXT) or other hardware extension technology. In aparticular embodiment, CHV manager 240 operates with GPE 226 to fullyencrypt virtual machines 260, 270, and 280 in storage. By operating CHVmanager from the platform level 292, client system 210 is secure frommalicious software or virus attacks that might otherwise affect theoperations of client system 210. Moreover, by encrypting virtualmachines 260, 270, and 280, CHV system 200 provides a tamper resistantstorage method for the images of virtual machines 260, 270, and 280.

In an optional embodiment, virtual machine hypervisor 250 can beoperated at protection level 294 to launch virtual machines 260, 270,and 280. Note that one of CHV manager 240 or virtual machine hypervisor250 is selected to launch virtual machines 260, 270, and 280, and thatwhere one of the CHV manager or the virtual machine hypervisor isoperating to manage the virtual machines, the other is not operating tomanage the virtual machines. When launched, virtual machines 260, 270,and 280 each include associated user data 268, 278, and 288; associateduser preference information 266, 276, and 286; associated applications264, 274, and 284; and associated operating systems 262, 272, and 282,respectively. Thus each virtual machine 260, 270, and 280 is isolatedfrom the others, operates as an individual information handling systemon client system 210, and shares the resources of client platformhardware 220. The operating CHV manager 240 or virtual machinehypervisor 250 functions to manage the access of each of virtualmachines 260, 270, and 280 to the resources of client platform hardware220. Virtual machines 260, 270, and 280 can include anti-virus software(not illustrated) that is tailored to the associated OSs 268, 278, and288, thus providing an additional layer of security to the operations ofCHV system 200.

The configuration of client platform 210 is determined by the particulardevices and architecture of client platform hardware 220 and the contentof trusted platform firmware 230 and CHV manager 240. The devices andarchitecture of client platform hardware 220 is determined at the timeof manufacture of client system 210. The content of trusted platformfirmware 230 and CHV manager 240 is installed on a non-volatile memorystorage device (not illustrated) in client platform hardware 220 at thetime of manufacture. In a particular embodiment, the manufacturer or auser of client platform 210 determines that the client platform isintended for use as a client hosted virtualization platform, andinitiates a hardware function to toggle an element of fuse/switch bank228 to enable CHV manager 240. For example, the manufacturer can provideclient platform 210 with CHV manager 240 enabled by toggling the elementof fuse/switch bank 228 prior to shipment to the user. In anotherexample, the manufacturer can provide client platform 210 with BIOS 232enabled by shipping the client platform to the user with the element offuse/switch bank 228 intact, such that client platform 210 boots usingBIOS 232. Here, the manufacturer can provide a way for the user totoggle the element of fuse/switch bank 228 to enable CHV manager 240.For example, the user can be presented with an option to enable CHVmanager 240 the first time client platform 210 is turned on, or clientplatform 210 can include a BIOS option to enable the CHV manager.

In a particular embodiment, toggling the element of fuse/switch bank 228permanently enables CHV manager 240. Here, each time client platform 210is booted, trusted platform firmware 230 performs low level system bootactivities, and then passes control to CHV manager 240. An example ofpermanently enabling CHV manager 240 can include writing to a particularbit or set of bits in a write-once device, such as by blowing a hardwarefuse in fuse/switch bank 228 that permanently provides for a boot paththat passes control to CHV manager 230, locking a boot block, writing toa programmable ROM such as an EPROM or a flash device, providing anothertype of hardware switch, or a combination thereof. Another example caninclude providing a particular bit or set of bits in fuse/switch bank228 in a platform ROM (not illustrated) that is not re-writable. In thecase of blowing a hardware fuse, the hardware fuse can be blown at thetime of manufacture of client system 210, or by a user of client systemat a later date. In the case of providing bits in a platform ROM, thebits can be provided at the time of manufacture of client system 210. Inanother embodiment, toggling the element of fuse/switch bank 228 can beperformed by a software function. For example, a hardware hash can beerased, a state authentication certificate can be authenticated by TPM222, another software function can be performed, or a combinationthereof.

In another embodiment, client platform 210 includes a mechanism toselectively override the permanent enablement of CHV manager 240 suchthat when client platform 210 is booted, BIOS 232 performs low levelsystem boot activities, and then passes control to virtual machinehypervisor 250. For example, the particular bit or set of bits infuse/switch bank 228 can reside in a re-writeable non-volatile memory,such that client platform 210 can be reprogrammed to disable CHV manager240. In another example, a boot option provided by trusted platformfirmware 230 can prompt a user of client platform 210 as to whether toboot to CHV manager 240 control, or to virtual machine hypervisor 250control. In yet another example, a hardware jumper, a hardware switch,or a BIOS settable switch can be provided whereby in a first positionclient platform 210 boots using BIOS 232, and in a second position theclient platform enables CHV manager 240.

When control of client system 210 is passed to the CHV manager, CHVmanager 242 launches service OS 242 to establish the controlledvirtualization environment, including launching virtual machines 250,260, and 270, and controlling the elements of client platform hardware220. Service OS 242 supports I/O port assignment between virtualmachines 250, 260, and 270 and client platform hardware 220, andprovides a secure interface to TPM 222, USH 224, and GPE 226 forpre-boot authentication, platform hardware and software authentication,secure biometric user authentication, and other trusted computingfeatures for the virtual machines. Service OS 242 also supports taskoriented devices and FVE storage for virtual machines 250, 260, and 270,and provides access to common storage devices. Policy manager 246implements security policies between virtual machines 250, 260, and 270and the devices of client platform hardware 220. Because the content oftrusted platform firmware 230 and CHV manager 240 resides on thenon-volatile memory storage device, the trusted platform firmware codeand the CHV manager code is executed securely within platform level 292,and the basic operation of client system 210 is less susceptible toattack from malicious program code, viruses, worms, or other corruptingprograms, and client system 210 embodies a secure CHV architecture.

FIG. 3 illustrates an embodiment of a method of providing a CHV systemin a flowchart form, starting at block 300. A CHV platform fuse is setin an information handling system in block 301. For example, amanufacturer of client platform 210 can determine that client platform210 is intended for use as CHV system 200, and can set a fuse infuse/switch bank 228. In an embodiment (not illustrated), a user ormanufacturer of client platform 210 can write a particular bit or set ofbits to platform ROM to configure client system 210 as CHV system 200.The information handling system is booted in block 302, and a decisionis made as to whether or not the information handling system has a BIOSboot option enabled in decision block 303. For example client platform210 may or may not include a boot option that permits client platform210 to boot with BIOS 232. If the information handling system does nothave a BIOS boot option enabled, the “NO” branch of decision block 303is taken, the boot process runs a CHV manager in block 304, and themethod ends in block 314. Thus client platform 210 can not have a BIOSboot option, and can launch CHV manager 240 and proceed to launchvirtual machines 250, 260, and 270.

If the information handling system has a BIOS boot option enabled, the“YES” branch of decision block 303 is taken, and a decision is made asto whether or not the BIOS boot option has been selected in decisionblock 305. If not, the “NO” branch of decision block 305 is taken, theboot process runs the CHV manager in block 304, and the method ends inblock 307. If the BIOS boot option is selected, the “YES” branch ofdecision block 305 is taken, the boot process proceeds to boot in BIOSin block 306, and the method ends in block 307. For example, a user ofclient platform 210 may select a boot option to boot client platform 210with BIOS 232, and client platform 210 can then boot using BIOS 232, andcan then launch virtual machine hypervisor 250 or another conventionaloperating system on the bare system.

The content of trusted platform firmware 230 and CHV manager 240 isalterable by reprogramming the non-volatile memory storage device,permitting revision control of the contents of trusted platform firmware230 and CHV manager 240. For example, firmware code associated with thedevices of client platform hardware 220, such as drivers, applicationprogramming interfaces (APIs), or user interfaces (UIs) in trustedplatform firmware 230, or the BIOS code associated with BIOS 232 can beperiodically updated or modified. Similarly, CHV manager code associatedwith service OS 242, drivers 244 or update manager 248, or policyprofile data associated with policy manager 246 can be periodicallyupdated or modified. Here, the fact that trusted platform firmware 230and CHV manager 240 are stored in the non-volatile memory storage deviceensures a level of security related to the ability to perform updates.

In another embodiment, update manager 248 functions in cooperation withTPM 222 to provide an encryption and authentication capability withregard to updates to trusted platform firmware 230 and CHV manager 240.Here, the capability to perform an update is enabled by a lockedplatform feature, where the key to unlock the feature is associated witha public key infrastructure (PKI). Updates to trusted platform firmware230 or to CHV manager 240 include key information. When update manager248 receives an update to trusted platform firmware 230 or to CHVmanager 240, update manager 248 provides the key information to TPM 222to authenticate the update. If the update is authenticated, then updatemanager 248 proceeds to implement the update. If the update is notauthenticated, the update manager 248 does not implement the update. Ina particular embodiment, updates to trusted platform firmware 230 or toCHV manager 240 are also encrypted, and TPM 222 decrypts authenticatedupdates prior to being implemented by update manager 248.

FIG. 4 illustrates an embodiment of a CHV update network 400 including aclient system 410, a network 420, and a CHV update system 430. CHVupdate system 430 includes a network interface 435, a client imagedatabase 440, a client image compiler 445, a virtual machine imagedatabase 450, user profile database 455, and a CHV update manager 460,and can be implemented as a server component of CHV update network 400.CHV update manager 460 includes a service OS image 462, virusdefinitions database 464, a PKI infrastructure 466, and drivers database468. Client system 410 is similar to client system 210, and canimplement a CHV system similar to CHV system 200. Client system 410 isconnected to network 420 via a network channel similar to networkchannel 172 of information handling system 100. Network 420 represents anetwork connection between client system 410 and CHV update system 430,and can include public networks such as the Internet or other publicnetworks, or private networks such as private internets or other privatenetworks.

CHV update system 430 communicates with client system 410 throughnetwork interface 435 which is connected to network 420. In a particularembodiment, CHV update system 430 determines when a trusted platformfirmware 412 or a CHV manager 414 in client system 410 is in need of anupdate, and CHV update system 430 pushes the needed update to firmware412 or to CHV manager 414, and an update manager (not illustrated) inCHV manager 414 performs the update to client system 410. In anotherembodiment, client system 410 periodically polls CHV update system 430to determine if updates are available for firmware 412 or for CHVmanager 414. If an update is available, then client system 410 pulls theavailable update for firmware 412 or for CHV manager 414, and the updatemanager performs the update to client system 410.

CHV update system 430 functions to create and maintain the updates forclient system 410. As such, the components that make up firmware 412 andCHV manager 414 are stored and maintained in a current state in CHVupdate manager 460. Thus the operating code for firmware 412 and CHVmanager 414 is maintained and updated with new capabilities, fixes todefective capabilities, patches to insecure capabilities, other updates,or a combination thereof. For example, a development team (notillustrated) can maintain the operating code for a service OS, storingmodified images in service OS image 462, can store virus definitions foran anti-virus capability of the service OS in virus definitions database464, and can store drivers associated with the various hardwarecomponents of client system 410 in drivers database 468. CHV updatemanager 460 combines the contents of service OS image 462, virusdefinitions database 464, and drivers database 468 to provide updatesfor firmware 412 and CHV manager 414, and encodes the updates with PKIinfrastructure 466 to provide a secure update for client system 410.Client image compiler 445 receives the secure update from CHV updatemanager 460, and combines the secure update with updated virtual machineimages from virtual machine image database 450, and with updated userprofiles from user profile database 455 to create a client image forclient system 410. Client image compiler 445 stores the client image inclient image database 440 to be pushed to or pulled from client system410.

FIG. 5 illustrates an embodiment of a method of pushing an update to aclient system in a flowchart form, starting at block 310. A CHV updatesystem reads a firmware and CHV manager revision level from a clientsystem in block 311. For example, CHV update system 430 can determine arevision level for firmware 412 and for CHV manager 414 in client system410. A decision is made as to whether or not the firmware or the CHVmanager are in need of updating in decision block 312. If not, the “NO”branch of decision block 312 is taken, and processing returns to block311, where the CHV update system reads a firmware and CHV managerrevision level from the client system. Here, CHV update system 430 canperform the reads of client system 410 on a periodic basis to ensurethat client system 410 includes current revisions of firmware 412 andCHV manager 414. If the firmware or the CHV manager are in need ofupdating, the “YES” branch of decision block 312 is taken, and the CHVupdate manager pushes the update to the client system in block 313. Thusclient image compiler 445 can combine the elements that are in need ofupdating from among virtual machine image database 450, user profiledatabase 455, service OS image 462, virus definitions 464, and drivers468, and CHV update system 430 can send the client image to clientsystem 410. An update manager in the client system installs the updatein block 314, and the method ends in block 315. Here, when client system410 receives the update from CHV update system 430, an update manager(not illustrated) can determine if the update is authentic using a TPM(not illustrated) and then can install authentic the update if it isdetermined to be authentic.

FIG. 6 illustrates an embodiment of a method of pulling an update to aCHV update system in a flowchart form, starting at block 320. A clientsystem polls the CHV update system to determine if an update isavailable for a firmware or a CHV manager on the client system in block321. For example, client system 410 can poll CHV update system 430 todetermine if an update is available for firmware 412 or for CHV manager414. A decision is made as to whether or not a firmware or CHV managerupdate are available in decision block 322. If not, the “NO” branch ofdecision block 322 is taken, and processing returns to block 321, wherethe client system polls the CHV update system to determine if an updateis available for the firmware or the CHV manager. Here, client system410 can poll CHV update system 430 on a periodic basis to ensure thatclient system 410 includes current revisions of firmware 412 and CHVmanager 414. If a firmware or CHV manager update are available, the“YES” branch of decision block 322 is taken, and the client system pullsthe updated firmware or CHV manager from the CHV update manager in block323. Thus a compiled client image can be stored in client image database440, and client system 410 can request the client image from CHV updatesystem 430. An update manager in the client system installs the updatein block 324, and the method ends in block 325. Here, when client system410 receives the update from CHV update system 430, the update managercan determine if the update is authentic using the TPM and then caninstall authentic the update if it is determined to be authentic.

In a particular embodiment, client system 410 includes a TPM similar toTPM 222 that can provide PKI-based authentication andencryption/decryption functions for the client system, a CHV managersimilar to CHV manager 240, and a service OS similar to service OS 242.Here, the service OS accesses the TPM to establish a PKI session withPKI infrastructure 466 in order to provide a secure communicationchannel between the service OS and CHV update system 430. When thesecure communication channel is established, client system 410 isauthenticated onto CHV update system 430, and can receive updatedfirmware and CHV manager code. In another embodiment, the service OSestablishes a virtual private network (VPN) session with CHV updatesystem 430 to authenticate client system 410. The PKI session and theVPN session can be maintained while client system 410 is connected tonetwork 420. Additionally, updates to the firmware and the CHV managercode can be digitally signed, for example by applying a hash function tothe update, and the digital signature can be verified in client system410 prior to implementing the updates. The VPN can also be establishedusing other cryptographic tunneling protocols, such as Internet ProtocolSecurity (IPsec), Secure Socket Layer (SSL), Datagram Transport LayerSecurity (DTLS), or another protocol, as needed or desired.

In a particular embodiment, CHV update system 430 is provided by themanufacturer of client system 410, such that updates related to theclient system hardware or firmware are provided in a timely manner. Inanother embodiment, CHV update system 430 is provided by an informationtechnology (IT) resource that is associated with the owner of clientsystem 410. Here, the owner can easily enforce policies in client system410, as described below.

FIG. 7 illustrates an embodiment of a CHV system 500 including clientplatform hardware 520, a CHV manager 540, and virtual machines 560 and570. Client platform hardware 520 includes an Ethernet NIC 521, awireless local area network (WiFi) NIC 523, and a USB port 525, and caninclude one or more additional I/O resources (not illustrated). CHVmanager 540 includes a policy manager 548. Virtual machines 560 and 570each include I/O policy information 561 and 571, respectively. In aparticular embodiment, CHV manager 540 is in control of access toEthernet NIC 521, WiFi NIC 523, USB port 525, and other I/O resources.As such, requests for I/O access from virtual machines 560 and 570 areprovided to CHV manager 540, and policy manager 548 determines if therequested I/O access is permitted, based upon the requesting virtualmachine's 560 or 570 respective I/O policy information 561 or 571. Inthe illustrated embodiment, I/O policy information 561 and 571 areincluded in CHV manager 540. In another embodiment (not illustrated),I/O policy information 561 is included in virtual machine 560 and I/Opolicy information 571 is included in virtual machine 570. In anotherembodiment (not illustrated), a portion of I/O policy information 561and 571 is included in CHV manager 540, and another portion of I/Opolicy information 561 and 571 is included in virtual machines 560 and570, respectively.

Policy manager 546 enforces granular control of access to Ethernet NIC521, WiFi NIC 523, USB port 525, and other I/O resources. Policy manager546 permits certain types of access requests and denies other accessrequests, and permits conditional access to the various resources ofclient platform hardware 520. As such, I/O policy information 561 and571 can provide for unrestricted access, blocked access, or conditionalaccess depending on the resource, on the user of the respective virtualmachine 560 or 570, on the content included in the access request, onthe target of the access request, or on other conditions as needed. Forexample, I/O policy information 561 may dictate that virtual machine 560has unrestricted access to Ethernet NIC 521, may not access USB port525, and has conditional access to WiFi NIC such that only access to acorporate WiFi network is permitted. Other examples include permittingaccess to USB port 525 only when the device connected to the USB port isan authenticated storage device, or when the device connected to the USBport is a human interface device such as a mouse or a keyboard. I/Opolicy information 561 and 571 can also provide for user consent eachtime a resource is accessed and for logging of file transfers to andfrom the resource. The content transferred into and out of therespective virtual machines 560 and 570 can also be filtered such thatinbound transfers can be checked for malware or viruses, and outboundtransfers can be checked to prevent data leaks.

FIG. 8 illustrates an embodiment of a method of implementing I/Opolicies in a CHV system. Starting at block 330, a CHV manager receivesan I/O access request in block 331. For example, virtual machine 560 canattempt to initiate a file transfer over Ethernet NIC 521, or a USBdevice plugged into USB port 525 can attempt to enumerate itself tovirtual machine 570, and CHV manager 520 can receive the transactionrequests. The CHV manager determines the source and destination of theI/O access request in block 332, and verifies an I/O access policy forI/O access requests with the determined source and destination in block333. Thus CHV manager 520 can identify the source and destination of thefile transfer from virtual machine 560 to Ethernet NIC 521, and canaccess I/O policy information 561 to determine if the requested filetransfer is permitted. Here, CHV manager can also determine the userassociated with virtual machine 560, the contents of the file to betransferred, or other information related to the I/O policy for virtualmachine 560. A decision is made as to whether or not the requested I/Oaccess is allowed in decision block 334. If so, the “YES” branch ofdecision block 334 is taken, the requested I/O access request isexecuted in block 335, and the method ends in block 336. For example,CHV manager 520 can determine that the file transfer from virtualmachine 560 to Ethernet NIC 521 is allowed and can execute the filetransfer. If the requested I/O access is not allowed, the “NO” branch ofdecision block 334 is taken, the requested I/O access request is deniedin block 337, and the method ends in block 336. For example, CHV manager520 can determine that virtual machine 570 is to be denied access to USBport 525 and can block the USB device from enumerating itself to virtualmachine 570.

In a particular embodiment, I/O policy information 561 and 571 areprovided to CHV system 500 by a CHV update system similar to CHV updatesystem 430. Thus, in the above embodiment where the CHV update system isprovided by the IT resource associated with the owner of CHV system 500,the IT resource can log onto the CHV system to provide updates to I/Opolicy information 561 and 571, to set the I/O policies, and to limit orexpand the functionality of the CHV system as needed or desired. In aparticular embodiment, I/O policy information 561 and 571 can includesecurity policy information and update policy information. The securitypolicy information sets the bounds for the capabilities of virtualmachines 560 and 570, respectively. For example, the security policyinformation can provide for the ability or inability of the associatedvirtual machine to access the Internet, or particular locations on theInternet, the ability to run or not run outside of a corporate network,the ability to access, change or delete information in a storagenetwork, or other security abilities. The update policy information setsthe parameters for CHV system 500 to access the CHV update system. Forexample, the update policy can determine a frequency of connection tothe CHV update system to check for updates, set a patch prioritizationfor CHV system 500, or set other parameters related to the connection tothe CHV update system. Moreover, the CHV update system can be utilizedin conjunction with other features of CHV system 500. For example, aservice processor can detect the presence of a network connection priorto power on of CHV update system 500.

FIG. 9 illustrates an embodiment of a CHV system 600 including clientplatform hardware 620, trusted platform firmware 630, a CHV manager 640,and virtual machines 660 and 670. Client platform hardware 620 includesan authentication device 621 and a system management random accessmemory (SMRAM) 623. An example of authentication device 621 includes akeyboard for entering a password, a unified security hub similar to USH224 connected to a biometric input device (not illustrated) or a smartcard reader (not illustrated), another type of authentication device, ora combination thereof. Trusted platform firmware 630 includes a BIOS 632and a pre-boot authentication module 634. CHV manager 640 includes asecure post office box module 642. Virtual machines 660 and 670 includeauthenticator modules 663 and 673, respectively. An example ofauthenticator modules 663 and 673 includes a graphical identificationand authentication (GINA) module, another type of authenticatorinterface, or a combination thereof.

Pre-boot authentication provides a way to authenticate CHV system 600prior to the launch of virtual machines 660 and 670 such that onlyauthenticated users gain access to the devices and resources of CHVsystem 600. FIG. 9 illustrates an embodiment of a method of providingpre-boot authentication in CHV system 600. Here, BIOS 632 generates apre-boot authentication request 601 to pre-boot authentication module634. Pre-boot authentication module 634 includes a sequestered operatingenvironment that prompts the user for authentication. The user providesthe authentication information via authentication device 621. Pre-bootauthentication module 634 verifies the authenticity of theauthentication information, and if the authentication information isverified, generates an authentication object and generates a pre-bootauthentication response 602 that sends the authentication object to BIOS632. BIOS 632 generates an authentication object store 603 that storesthe authentication object in SMRAM 623. Upon completion of theauthentication object store 603, BIOS 632 passes execution to CHVmanager 640.

When CHV manager 640 launches virtual machine 660, the user of virtualmachine 660 needs the authentication object in order to gain access tothe devices and resources of CHV system 600. To obtain theauthentication object, authenticator 663 generates an authenticationrequest 604 to BIOS 632 in system management mode (SMM). In response toa first authentication request, the BIOS generates an authenticationobject transfer 605, sending the authentication object from SMRAM 623 tosecure post office box module 642 in CHV manager 640. CHV manager 640then generates an authentication response 606 to send the authenticationobject from secure post office box module 642 to authenticator 663, thusproviding virtual machine 660 with authenticated access to the devicesand resources of CHV system 600. Secure post office box module 642retains the authentication object for subsequent authenticationrequests, such as authentication request 607 generated by authenticator673 in virtual machine 670, in response to which CHV manager 640generates the authentication response 608 to send the authenticationobject to authenticator 673. In another embodiment (not illustrated),SMRAM 623 retains the authentication object and provides theauthentication object to secure post office box module 642 for eachsubsequent authorization request. In another embodiment (notillustrated), SMRAM 623 and secure post office box module 642 canrepresent a common secure memory space for CHV system 600, thuseliminating the need for the authentication object transfer betweenSMRAM 623 and secure post office box module 642.

FIG. 10 illustrates another embodiment of CHV system 600 includingclient platform hardware 620, CHV manager 640, and virtual machines 660and 670. Client platform hardware 620 includes a TPM 622. CHV manager640 includes secure post office box module 642 and a TPM driverinterface 644. Virtual machines 660 and 670 include device drivers 665and 675, respectively. Virtual machines 660 and 670 have periodic reasonto access TPM 622 for various encryption/decryption services, forvalidating hardware associated with CHV system 600, for validatingsoftware operated on virtual machines 660 and 670, for other trustedprocessing operations, or a combination thereof. When virtual machine660 needs to access TPM 622, device driver 665 generates a TPM request611 that is sent to CHV manager 640. TPM driver interface 644 receivesthe TPM request 611 and forwards CHV manager TPM request 612 to TPM 622.TPM 622 receives CHV manager TPM request 612, creates TPM data, andgenerates a TPM response 613 that sends the TPM data to secure postoffice box module 642. Secure post office box module 642 stores the TPMdata, and also generates a CHV manager TPM response 614 that sends theTPM data to device driver 665. When virtual machine 670 needs to accessthe TPM data, device driver 675 generates a TPM request 615 TPM driverinterface 644. CHV manager then generates a CHV manager TPM response 616that sends the TPM data to device driver 675.

FIG. 11 illustrates an embodiment of a CHV system 700 including clientplatform hardware 720, a CHV manager 740, and virtual machines 760, 770,and 770. Client platform hardware 720 includes a task oriented device725. Task oriented device 725 is characterized by the fact thattransactions targeted to task oriented device 725 are not amenable totime sliced execution, but are atomic, such that a transaction providedto task oriented device 725 is processed by the task oriented device asa whole transaction. An example of task oriented device 725 includes aGPE engine, a deep packet inspection engine, another task orienteddevice, or a combination thereof. CHV manager 740 includes a devicedriver interface 742, a CHV task manager 744, virtual machinetransaction queues 746, 748, and 750, and a CHV device driver 754.Virtual machine transaction queues 746, 748, and 750 are associated withvirtual machines 760, 770, and 780, respectively. Virtual machines 760,770, and 770 include device drivers 767, 777, and 787, respectively. CHVManager 740 operates to receive requests for the services of taskoriented device 725, segregate the requests based upon the issuingvirtual machine 760, 770, or 780, determine a priority for the requestand issue the request to task oriented device 725. When task orienteddevice 725 responds to the request, CHV manager 740 returns the responseto the requesting virtual machine 760, 770, or 780.

When one or more of virtual machines 760, 770 and 780 have need of theservice of task oriented device 725, they generate a task orienteddevice transaction 701 from device drivers 767, 777, and 787 that isreceived by device driver interface 742. The task oriented devicetransaction preferably includes a header and data. The header identifiesthe type of transaction, the source of the transaction, otherinformation about the transaction, instructions for the execution of thetransaction, or a combination thereof. For example, where task orienteddevice 725 is an encryption/decryption engine or security processor, theheader can include an encryption key identifier, a decryption algorithmidentifier, an action identifier, other information used by anencryption/decryption engine or security processor, or a combinationthereof. The data includes the information to be processed by taskoriented device 725. Device driver interface 742 generates a taskoriented device request 702 that is received by CHV task manager 744.The task oriented device request includes the header and data from thetask oriented device transaction.

CHV task manager 744 operates to identify the source of the taskoriented device request, to determine a priority, and to place aprioritized task oriented device request 703 into the virtual machinetransaction queue 746, 748, or 750 associated with the particularvirtual machine 760, 770, or 780 that generated the task oriented devicetransaction. The prioritized task oriented device request includes theheader and the data from the task oriented device transaction, a taskidentifier field, and a priority field. When a particular prioritizedtask oriented device request reaches the head of the particular virtualmachine transaction queue, the virtual machine transaction queue issuesa current task oriented device request 704 to CHV device driver 754. CHVdevice driver 754 generates an issued task oriented device transaction706 to task oriented device 725.

Task oriented device 725 performs the requested task identified in theissued task oriented device request and issues a task oriented deviceresponse 707 to CHV device driver 754. CHV device driver 754 forwardsthe task oriented device response to CHV task manager 744. CHV devicetask manager 744 matches the task oriented device response with theassociated prioritized task oriented device request to determine thevirtual machine 760, 770, or 780 that issued the associated taskoriented device transaction, and forwards the task oriented deviceresponse to device driver interface 742 for response to the associatedvirtual machine 760, 770, or 780.

FIG. 12 illustrates an embodiment of a CHV system 800 including clientplatform hardware 820, a CHV manager 840, and virtual machines 860, 870,and 880. Client platform hardware 820 includes a GPE 826 and a fullvolume encryption (FVE) storage device 827. CHV manager 840 includes astorage driver interface 842, and a GPE driver 844. Virtual machines860, 870, and 880 include storage drivers 869, 879, and 889,respectively. Here CHV manager 840 functions to provide a unifiedencrypted storage capacity for virtual machines 860, 870, and 880, inaddition to an unencrypted storage capacity.

When one or more of virtual machines 860, 870 or 880 issue a storagerequest, the virtual machine generates a storage transaction 801 fromstorage drivers 869, 879, or 889 that is received by storage driverinterface 842. Device driver interface 742 determines if the storagetransaction is intended for FVE storage device 827 or for an unencryptedstorage device (not illustrated). If the storage transaction is intendedfor FVE storage device 827, device driver interface 742 forwards thestorage request 802 to GPE driver 844, which in turn forwards thestorage request 803 to GPE 826. If the storage request is a writerequest, then GPE 826 encrypts a data portion of the storage request inaccordance with information in a header portion of the storage request,and stores the encrypted data on FVE storage device 827. If the storagerequest is a read request, then GPE 826 issues the storage request 804to FVE storage device 827, and FVE returns encrypted data 805 to GPE826. GPE 826 decrypts the encrypted data based upon information in theheader portion of the storage request, and forwards decrypted data 806to GPE driver 844. GPE driver 844 forwards the decrypted data 807 tostorage driver interface 842 which returns the decrypted data to therequesting virtual machine 860, 870, or 880.

FIG. 13 illustrates an embodiment of a CHV system 900 including clientplatform hardware 920, a CHV manager 940, and virtual machines 960 and970. Client platform hardware 920 includes an authentication device 921,a TPM 922, a USH 924, an I/O port 925, and a GPE 926. Virtual machine960 is a security virtual machine. Virtual machine 970 is a functionalvirtual machine. CHV manager 940 operates to assign the secure resourcesof CHV system 900 (such as authentication device 921, TPM 922, USH 924,and GPE 926) to virtual machine 960. As such, rights to the secureresources are passed to virtual machine 960. In addition, CHV manager940 assigns other resource of CHV system 900 (such as I/O port 925) tovirtual machine 960, and rights to the other resources are passed tovirtual machine 960. In a particular embodiment, the binding of theresources to virtual machine 960 is performed by CHV manager 940 whenCHV system 900 is booted, and prior to the launching of any additionalvirtual machines such as virtual machine 970. Then, when virtual machine970 is launched, the bindings, rights, access, and authentication forvirtual machine 970 are managed through virtual machine 960.

In binding the resources to virtual machine 960, authenticationcertificates and user credentials are verified through TPM 922, orthrough I/O 925 to storage devices (not illustrated) of CHV system 900or to external servers (not illustrated) that are connected to the CHVsystem. Access to the storage devices can be encrypted through GPE 926.A secure communication channel can be established to the externalservers through a PKI infrastructure or a VPN connection. Where theauthentication certificates are verified through TPM 922, theauthentication certificates can be pre-loaded onto CHV system 900 by themanufacturer, alleviating the need to obtain the certificates when theCHV system is first powered on. Additionally, when the resources of CHVsystem 900 are fully assigned to virtual machine 960, the configurationcan be sealed and digitally signed, such that each time CHV system ispowered on, tampering can be detected by comparing the configuration atboot with the signed configuration.

When CHV system 900 is powered on, CHV manager 940 determines theconfiguration of client platform hardware 920 in operation 901 andreceives authentication certificates and user credentials from theclient platform hardware in operation 902. CHV manager 940 assigns theresources of CHV system 900 to virtual machine 960 in operation 903. IfCHV system 900 is being powered on for the first time, virtual machine960 digitally signs the resource bindings and provides the digitalsignature to CHV manager 940 in step 904. CHV manager securely storesthe digital signature to either TPM 922 or to the storage device ofexternal server in step 905. When virtual machine 970 is launched,virtual machine 960 provides the bindings needed by virtual machine 970in step 906.

FIG. 14 illustrates another embodiment of CHV system 900 includingclient platform hardware 920, a CHV manager 940, and a service processor990. Client platform hardware 920 includes a NIC 927 and anothercomponent 928. CHV system 900 is connected to an authentication server980. Component 928 includes a certificate 929. Certificate 929 isgenerated by the manufacturer of component 928 using a private key heldby the manufacturer, and is combined with a unique number associatedwith the component (such as a serial number). Certificate 929 issecurely stored by component 928, such as in a storage location of aread-only device of the component, or embedded in an integrated circuitof the component.

During system power up, or when component 928 is installed into CHVsystem 900, CHV manager 940 checks the validity of certificate 929. Ifcertificate 929 cannot be validated, then CHV manager 940 isolatescomponent 928, denying access to the functions of the component to usersof CHV system 900, or grants limited functionality to the features ofthe component. For example, if the component is a storage device, accessmay be granted to view a directory of the storage device, but not tocopy information from the storage device to CHV system 900.

In a particular embodiment, certificate 929 is checked locally to verifythat certificate 929 is authentic, in operation 911. For example, CHVsystem 900 can be pre-loaded with authenticated components, and theauthentication credentials can be stored in TPM 922. If noauthentication credentials are available locally, then CHV manager 940determines if CHV system 900 is connected to authentication server 980in step 912. If so, CHV manager 940 obtains the authenticationcredential from authentication server 980 in step 913. If there is nolocal copy of the authentication credential, if there is no connectionto authentication server 980, or if certificate 929 is not validated bythe authentication server, then the functionality of component 928 islimited. In a particular embodiment, when component 928 is installedinto CHV system 900, but before the CHV system is powered on, serviceprocessor 990 checks locally to verify that certificate 929 isauthentic, in operation 914. If no authentication credentials areavailable locally, then service processor 990 determines if CHV system900 is connected to authentication server 980 and obtains theauthentication credential from authentication server 980 in step 915. Inthis way, the authentication credential can be stored locally prior topower up of CHV system 900.

When referred to as a “device,” a “module,” or the like, the embodimentsdescribed above can be configured as hardware. For example, a portion ofan information handling system device may be hardware such as, forexample, an integrated circuit (such as an Application SpecificIntegrated Circuit (ASIC), a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), astructured ASIC, or a device embedded on a larger chip), a card (such asa Peripheral Component Interface (PCI) card, a PCI-express card, aPersonal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) card,or other such expansion card), or a system (such as a motherboard, asystem-on-a-chip (SoC), or a stand-alone device). The device or modulecan include software, including firmware embedded at a device, such as aPentium class or PowerPC™ brand processor, or other such device, orsoftware capable of operating a relevant environment of the informationhandling system. The device or module can also include a combination ofthe foregoing examples of hardware or software. Note that an informationhandling system can include an integrated circuit or a board-levelproduct having portions thereof that can also be any combination ofhardware and software.

Devices, modules, resources, or programs that are in communication withone another need not be in continuous communication with each other,unless expressly specified otherwise. In addition, devices, modules,resources, or programs that are in communication with one another cancommunicate directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries.

Although only a few exemplary embodiments have been described in detailabove, those skilled in the art will readily appreciate that manymodifications are possible in the exemplary embodiments withoutmaterially departing from the novel teachings and advantages of theembodiments of the present disclosure. Accordingly, all suchmodifications are intended to be included within the scope of theembodiments of the present disclosure as defined in the followingclaims. In the claims, means-plus-function clauses are intended to coverthe structures described herein as performing the recited function andnot only structural equivalents, but also equivalent structures.

What is claimed is:
 1. A client hosted virtualization system (CHVS)comprising: a security processor; a host processor operable to executecode; a component that includes a certificate; and a non-volatile memoryincluding: first code to implement a basic input/output system for theCHVS; and second code to implement a virtualization manager operable to:initialize the CHVS; launch a virtual machine on the CHVS; and determinethat the certificate is valid with the security processor toauthenticate the component; wherein the host processor is operable to:determine if a switch of the CHVS is in a first state or a second state;execute the first code in response to determining that the switch is inthe first state; and execute the second code in response to determiningthat the switch is in the second state.
 2. The CHVS of claim 1, whereinthe certificate is provided by a manufacturer of the component.
 3. TheCHVS of claim 2, wherein the certificate is generated based on a privatekey and an identification associated with the component.
 4. The CHVS ofclaim 2, wherein the virtualization manager is further operable to:determine if the CHVS is coupled to a root authenticator of themanufacturer; authenticate the component with the root authenticator inresponse to the CHVS being coupled to the root authenticator; andauthenticate the component locally in response to the CHVS not beingcoupled to the root authenticator.
 5. The CHVS of claim 1, wherein thevirtualization manager is further operable to enable a function of thecomponent in response to the component being authenticated.
 6. The CHVSof claim 5, wherein the virtualization manager is further operable todisable the function in response to the component failing to beauthenticated.
 7. The CHVS of claim 1, wherein the certificate is storedon a read-only memory of the component.
 8. The CHVS of claim 1, whereinthe certificate is embedded in a chip of the component.
 9. A method ofproviding a client hosted virtualization system (CHVS), comprising:storing first code in a non-volatile memory of the CHVS to implement abasic input/output system for the CHVS; storing second code in thenon-volatile memory to implement a virtualization manager for the CHVS;determining if a switch of the CHVS is in a first state or a secondstate; executing the first code when the switch is in the first state;and executing the second code when the switch is in the second state,wherein in executing the second code, the method further comprises:initializing the CHVS; launching a virtual machine on the CHVS; andauthenticating a component with a security processor of the CHVS todetermine that a certificate of the component is valid.
 10. The methodof claim 9, wherein the certificate is provided by a manufacturer of thecomponent.
 11. The method of claim 10, further comprising generating thecertificate based on a private key and an identification associated withthe component.
 12. The method of claim 10, wherein in executing thesecond code, the method further comprises: determining if the CHVS iscoupled to a root authenticator of the manufacturer; authenticating thecomponent with the root authenticator in response to the CHVS beingcoupled to the root authenticator; and authenticating the componentlocally in response to the CHVS not being coupled to the rootauthenticator.
 13. The method of claim 9, wherein, in executing thesecond code, the method further comprises enabling a function of thecomponent in response to the component being authenticated.
 14. Themethod of claim 13, wherein, in executing the second code, the methodfurther comprises disabling the function in response to the componentfailing to be authenticated.
 15. A non-transitory computer-readablestorage medium and includes instructions for carrying out a method, themethod comprising: storing first code in a non-volatile memory of theCHVS to implement a basic input/output system for the CHVS; storingsecond code in the non-volatile memory to implement a virtualizationmanager for the CHVS; determining if a switch of the CHVS is in a firststate or a second state; executing the first code when the switch is inthe first state; and executing the second code when the switch is in thesecond state, wherein in executing the second code, the method furthercomprises: initializing the CHVS; launching a virtual machine on theCHVS; and authenticating a component with a security processor of theCHVS, by determining that a certificate of the component is valid. 16.The computer-readable storage medium of claim 15, wherein thecertificate is provided by a manufacturer of the component.
 17. Thecomputer-readable storage medium of claim 15, the method furthercomprising generating the certificate based on a private key and anidentification associated with the component.
 18. The computer-readablestorage medium of claim 17, wherein in executing the second code, themethod further comprises: determining if the CHVS is coupled to a rootauthenticator of the manufacturer; authenticating the component with theroot authenticator in response to the CHVS being coupled to the rootauthenticator; and authenticating the component locally in response tothe CHVS not being coupled to the root authenticator.
 19. Thecomputer-readable storage medium of claim 15, wherein, in executing thesecond code, the method further comprises enabling a function of thecomponent in response to the component being authenticated.
 20. Thecomputer-readable storage of claim 19, wherein, in executing the secondcode, the method further comprises disabling the function in response tothe component failing to be authenticated.